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POWERLINE: THE FIRST BATTLE OF AMERICA'S ENERGY WAR.

By Barry M. Casper and Paul .David Wel!stone. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press. 1981. Pp. ix, 314. Cloth $18.75; paper $7.95.
Power/ine is must reading for utility lawyers, regulators, and anyone who participates in the formulation of energy policy. Casper and
Wellstone examine an aspect of energy policy that, if considered at
all, is usually an afterthought: the impact of our nation's "hard energy path" 1 on the people who live near large energy facilities. In

1. British physicist Amory Lovins has detailed two different paths to the developed world's
energy future and the attendant sociopolitical consequences of each path. The "hard energy
path" is characterized by an emphasis on technological solutions of increasingly larger scales:
nuclear power plants and new means of fossil fuel utilization. The "soft energy path" focuses
on "end use needs" and on matching those needs with smaller-scale generation and transmis-
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the process, they illuminate the clash of fundamental values implicit
in technological decision-making and raise disturbing questions
about the ability of present decision-making structures to reconcile
competing values without alienating affected parties. 2
The book's focal point is the resistance of Minnesota farmers to a
proposed high voltage powerline designed to bring electricity from a
massive coal-fired powerplant in North Dakota to Minneapolis and
St. Paul. The CU powerline, as it came to be known, was the first
test of Minnesota's heralded Environmental Policy3 and Power Plant
Siting Acts.4 These acts centralized the siting process and provided
for public hearings-and citizens' advisory committees. Although the
new process seemed to be a model for democratic decision-making,
several important decisions about where to build the line were made
before the public had a chance to participate. First, the line's end
points were fixed; the questions of where it would enter Minnesota
and where it would terminate near the Twin Cities would not be
affected by public comments. Second, public comment was limited
to the desirability of the four alternative corridors specified by the
state. Third, the Environmental Quality Council (EQC) excluded all
municipalities from the powerline's route.
The power companies' technical arguments supporting their preferred route revealed the value choices implicit in the routing process. They had divided every county into square mile boxes and
assigned each box an "avoidance rating" - the higher the number,
the more desirable it was to avoid routing the powerline through the
box. Airfields, state parks, federal lands, and lakes were excluded
entirely from routing consideration; state-owned lands, interstate
highways, and forest lands were rated five, four, and three, respectively. Farm land was rated zero (p. 64).
sion systems. A. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS 38-46 (1979). The primary argument for the
"soft energy path" is the adverse sociopolitical effect of the "hard energy path." Id at 147-59.
Powerline can be accurately viewed as a case study of those consequences. The correlation
with Lovins's predictions is remarkable.
2. In addition to the alienation of loyal citizens, Lovins presents a comprehensive indictment of the "hard energy path":
[T)he hard path . . . demands strong, interventionist central control, bypasses traditional
market mechanisms, concentrates political and economic power, encourages urbanization,
persistently distorts political structures and social priorities, increases bureaucratization
and alienation, compromises professional ethics, is probably inimical to greater distributional equity within and among nations, inequitably divorces costs from benefits, enhances vulnerability and the paramilitarization of civilian life, introduces major economic
and social risks, reinforces current trends towards centrifugal politics and the decline of
federalism, and nurtures - even requires - elitist technocracy whose exercise erodes the
legitimacy of democratic government.
A. LOVINS, supra note 2, at 148 (footnotes omitted). Listed in this manner, Lovins's fears seem
apocalyptic; the presence of virtually every one of these consequences in Powerline suggests
that he should be taken more seriously.
3. MINN. STAT.§§ 116D.O1-116D.O7 (1973).
4. MINN. STAT,§§ 116C.51-116C.69 (1973).
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In the farmers' minds, the issue assumed symbolic significance -

city versus country. They were outraged by the power companies'
avoidance ratings and believed that these ratings allowed urban areas to avoid the consequences of wasteful energy habits (p. 71). But
since they were unable to quarrel with either the avoidance ratings
or the decision to build the powerline in the initial round of public
hearings, and lacked the expertise to challenge the companies' assertions about the line's safety, the farmers were reduced to asking the
Council to "build it on someone else's property, not mine" (p. 79).
In the end, the EQC accepted the staff's recommendation and approved a route that included every inch of the power companies'
original proposal (p. 88). The farmers were then allowed to challenge the need for the line, but that experience proved equally frustrating. In June of 1976, a final route was designated and a
construction permit granted (p. 127).
Minnesota's forward-looking public participation procedures
only alienated the farmers. After their attempts to challenge the
powerline in the courts failed (pp. 172-77), the farmers began to harass the surveyors. They blocked the surveyors' paths with large farm
machinery and manure and ran chainsaws near them to disrupt radio communications. Gradually, the farmers' techniques became
more sophisticated. With the arrival of George Crocker - an experienced antiwar activist - they began an organized program of nonviolent civil disobedience. A confrontation seemed imminent when
the governor ordered the largest mobilization of state troopers in
Minnesota history, but the expected violence did not ensue, and the
construction continued. By late summer of 1978, the towers had
been erected, the companies had begun to string the powerline, and
the farmers had escalated their private energy war. On August 2,
1978, the first tower fell. In all, fourteen of the mammoth towers
succumbed to the "bolt weevils." The powerline's vital glass insulators became a favorite target of local marksmen. The power companies' response to this vandalism - hiring three hundred security
guards - only intensified the farmers' opposition; as Power/ine went
to press, the companies were seeking to bring the line under federal
jurisdiction in an attempt to improve the enforcement e.ffort.
Powerline raises several questions about the processes by which
large energy projects are approved and about American energy policy in general. It dramatically illustrates the problem of the "sacrificial lamb." Massive technological solutions to energy shortages
intensify and localize the social costs of producing energy. The
question of siting thus becomes controversial. Rural populations are
often asked to make sacrifices to satisfy the nation's insatiable demand for energy, and a number of ways of addressing their legitimate objections have been devised. In some instances, society has
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attempted to "buy off" rural areas by imposing a severance tax. 5 In
other cases, states have attempted to reach accommodations that
minimize social disruptions by involving the affected groups in the
decision-making process.
'
As Casper and Wellstone indicate, this second approach often
fails because the conflict results from a clash of values. The Minnesota farmers saw the powerline as a means of imposing urban-created problems on them. Its construction through rural areas
(scrupulously avoiding any municipalities) allowed urban populations to avoid the consequences of their wasteful energy practices.
" 'As long as people are shielded from the results of their actions,' "
argued one opponent of the line, " 'no needed changes are ever going
to be made' " (p. 72). The farmers sought to raise fundamental questions about responsibility and our "hard energy path,'' but public
participation was limited to carefully defined technical issues.
Public participation is also likely to be ineffective when many
critical decisions are made before the public has a chance to present
its case. Before the farmers were able to voice their concerns, the
power companies had invested an enormous amount of money, and
the powerline project had built up a powerful momentum. This momentum carried the day despite dramatic changes in one of the project's underlying assumptions regarding the price of coal (p. 118).
The effectiveness of public participation may also be limited by
citizen groups' lack of money and expertise. The Minnesota farmers
did not have the economic or technical resources to challenge the
power companies' assertions about the health and safety effects of
the powerline or about the future demand for energy. In an adversarial setting, therefore, the farmers were unable to rebut the arguments made by the companies' hired experts and big-city lawyers.
Because the government's role was merely judicial, no real evidence
was developed to counter the data generated by the power
companies.
The social dislocation and alienation documented by Casper and
Wellstone should lead to a rethinking of the "hard energy path."
The Minnesota farmers' attempt to prompt such a rethinking, at least
on a local level, failed because they were offered no forum in which
to raise the issue. At the very least, Powerline should cause us to
question the public participation model of decision-making. Unless
a real opportunity to shape the decision-makers' tbinkinB is afforded,
the model may ultimately convert the most patriotic of citizens into
environmental guerillas.
Casper and Wellstone raise these difficult questions in a fascinating manner. Unfortunately, their biases interfere with the objectivity
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981) (upholding
Montana's severance tax on coal mined in the state, including coal mined on federal land).
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of their tale and with the credibility of their message. Although the
book masquerades as a work of serious social scholarship, at least
one of the authors actually participated in the farmers' movement
(pp. 245, 249). But Power/ine is too important a book to write off as
mere polemic. It details the political consciousness-raising and alienation of bedrock Americans. It reveals the value clashes implicit in
seemingly technological decisions and raises troubling questions
about America's energy policy. It suggests that the type of environmental "terrorism" experienced in West Germany and Japan may
have a toehold in the United States. It is a harbinger of future
clashes. If Minnesota farmers fought the first battle in America's energy war, Power/ine is its manifesto.

